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Abstract 
Endogenously chosen punishment institutions perform well in increasing contributions and long-
term payoﬀs in social dilemma situations. However, they suﬀer from (a) initial reluctance of 
subjects to join the punishment institution and (b) initial eﬃciency losses due to frequent 
punishment. We investigate experimentally the eﬀects of social learning on the acceptance and 
the eﬃciency of a peer punishment mechanism in an institution choice experiment. Providing 
participants with a social history – presenting the main results of an identical previous experiment 
conducted with diﬀerent subjects – decreases the initial reluctance towards the punishment 
institution significantly. With social history, cooperative groups reach the social optimum more 
rapidly and there is lower eﬃciency loss due to reduced punishment. Our findings shed light on 
the importance of social learning for the acceptance of seemingly unpopular but socially desirable 
mechanisms.  
JEL classification: C92; H41  
Keywords: Social dilemmas; Social history; Social learning; Punishment; Institution choice  
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1. Introduction  
Experimental studies identify the possibility to punish free-riders as a valuable means to sustain 
cooperation in social dilemmas (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; see also the 
reviews by Gächter and Hermann, 2009; and Chaudhuri, 2011). While exogenously (by the 
experimenter) installed punishment institutions succeed to increase contributions, they often do 
not produce significantly higher (overall) payoffs than the voluntary contribution mechanism 
(VCM) without the punishment option (cf. Egas and Riedl, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008).1  
A recent strand of studies show that endogenous choice of punishment institutions may also 
induce high contributions to a public good and increase the institution’s eﬃciency (Sutter et al. 
2010; Ertan et al., 2009; Gürerk et al., 2010; Gürerk et al., 2009; Tyran and Feld, 2006).2 
Although punishment mechanisms in these studies are the more efficient institutions “in the long 
run”, their overall efficiency often suffer from two stable behavioral patterns. First, (initially) 
subjects show a great reluctance to interact with each other in the presence of punishment 
possibilities. Second, in punishment environments, in the beginning – similar to exogenously 
installed punishment institutions – there is an efficiency loss due to frequent punishment. 
The research question of this paper is this: How can be the initial efficiency loss mitigated in 
order to improve the overall performance of endogenously chosen punishment institutions? This 
question is closely linked to the initial poor acceptance of the punishment institution. So, we may 
reformulate our research question: How the initial acceptance – and linked with that – the initial 
and hence the overall efficiency of endogenous punishment institutions could be increased? 
Before proposing an answer to this question let us speculate on the reasons for the initial 
reluctance to choose punishment institution. First, subjects may have a “natural aversion” against 
punishment since they associate negative feelings with it. Social psychologists define negative 
sanctions as deliberate acts that lead to unpleasant inner states that the punished person wants to 
                                                           
1 In punishment institutions, there exist efficiency losses due to severe and/or frequent punishment acts, especially 
in the beginning phase of the play (see e.g. Decker et al., 2003); due to “anti‐social” punishment (Cinyabuguma et 
al., 2006) or counter‐punishment (Denant‐Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008) or if the cost of punishment is 
too high (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). Extending the experimental time horizon may improve the overall 
eﬃciency of the peer‐punishment mechanism (Gächter et al., 2008, Rand et al., 2009; Ambrus and Greiner, 2010). 
2 We will discuss these studies in the related literature section. 
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avoid. Second, subjects may also fear to be exposed to unjustified punishment. In fact, in 
experiments, punishment of high contributors is a frequently observed phenomenon 
(Cinyabuguma et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008). A third possible explanation is that subjects 
simply do not anticipate correctly that the punishment institution is the more efficient institution 
in the long-run. If subjects knew ex-ante that the punishment institution generates low efficiency 
in the beginning but yields high payoff in the future, they probably focus on the long-term benefit 
and join it right from the beginning. However, subjects could also focus on the downside caused 
by the short-term loss and hence shun away from the punishment institution. 
In this study, we investigate the last proposed possible explanation, i.e., how ex-ante information 
about the punishment institution affects subjects’ acceptance for this institution. For this, we 
conduct a social history treatment in which we provide subjects with the complete history of a 
endogenously chosen punishment institution as occurred in a previous experiment. This social 
history treatment (in the following abbreviated by SHT) is the exact replication of the PUN 
treatment from the study of Gürerk et al. (2010) in which subjects individually choose in each 
period between institutions with and without punishment possibilities before interacting with 
others who choose the same institution in a public goods setting. The only diﬀerence between the 
PUN and the SHT treatments is that in SHT, a social history3 reporting the main results of PUN is 
given to the subjects. 
The social history provides subjects with information that may help them to identify cognitively 
that the punishment institution is the more efficient mechanism in the long run. On the other 
hand, social history may lead subjects to simply imitate the most common behavior in PUN 
without realizing intellectually that doing so they will be better off in the end. For example, 
subjects may imitate by simply choosing the historically most popular institution. 
To identify unambiguously whether the behavior we would possibly observe in SHT is due to 
social learning and not mere imitation we conduct another treatment called SH-Half which 
provides subjects only with a subset of social history information given in SHT. Specifically, in 
SH-Half, we provide subjects solely with the history of institutional choice as occurred in PUN 
but with no other information given in the social history of SHT. If behavior observed in SH-Half 
                                                           
3 For details of the information presented in the social history see Section 3. 
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is closer to PUN and different from SHT, we may be more confident that what we observe in 
SHT is indeed social learning. If, however, behavior in SH-Half is more similar to SHT, then the 
data may be interpreted as an evidence for mere imitation. 
Previous experimental studies show that social history may affect subjects’ behavior. In their 
influential “trust game” study, Berg et al. (1995) find significant eﬀects of social history on 
subjects’ choices. With social history, both amounts invested by the sender and the amount sent 
back by the responder increase. A replication study by Ortmann et al. (2000) with some 
additional treatments confirms the results of Berg et al. (1995). On the other hand, there is also 
some literature reporting no change in subjects’ behavior when they are provided with 
information on earlier play of another cohort (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). This study is a 
variant of the trust game in which the sender states how much she wants the responder to transfer 
back and may activate a punishment option (or not) for the case the responder does not meet the 
desired amount. The results show if senders choose to activate the punishment option, then the 
actual back transfers are lower and senders earn less than when senders deliberately refrain from 
using the fine. In a social history treatment, senders were informed about this result. Knowing 
that, roughly the same percentage of senders still activated the punishment option, i.e., social 
history did not change senders’ behavior. 
Like social history, advice giving4 also unfolds its impact through social learning. Schotter (2003) 
reviews a series of studies on advice giving, most of them “intergenerational games”. In these 
studies, successors who take advice from their predecessors play the same game diﬀerently than 
their advice givers did. The advice takers tend to follow the advices of the advice givers. 
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) report that advice – given as free-form text messages by individuals – 
increases contributions to a public good if it becomes common knowledge. 
With one exception, the above studies show that people apparently react to information provided 
in social history and advices. In some settings, this information helps increase trust and positive 
reciprocity (Berg et al. 1995, Ortmann et al. 2000), in others it serves as a coordination device, 
e.g., in a public goods setting moving the contributions to rather high levels even in the absence 
                                                           
4 Advice giving differs from the social history in our study since it involves an active transfer of personal experience 
between individuals and groups. We are interested in situations, in which the experience made with a mechanism 
is transferred passively to others rather than directly and personally. 
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of any sanctions (Chaudhuri et al. 2006). Thus, altogether, we believe that the findings from the 
existing studies on social history and advice giving presented above support the hypothesis that 
social history in our experiment could have an enhancing effect on cooperation and an 
accelerating effect on the speed of convergence to the socially efficient state of full cooperation. 
Our main results support the conjectures posed above. With social history, the initial acceptance 
of the punishment institution increases significantly. Contributions towards the public good are 
significantly higher than without social history right from the beginning and they converge earlier 
to socially efficient level. If we consider the society as a whole including both punishment and 
non-punishment institutions, the payoffs are the highest with social history. Our results underline 
the relevance of transferring experience based information to increase efficiency. We contribute 
to the existing literature by confirming the cooperation enhancing effect of social history in a 
more complicated experimental setting than previous studies. Furthermore, we show that the 
driving force behind the success of social history is social learning rather than mere imitation.  
The following section discusses the related literature on endogenous institution choice. Section 3 
describes the experimental design and procedure. Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Previous experimental studies provide evidence that subjects are reluctant to choose a 
punishment option/institution when they have the choice only one-time. If subjects play a series 
of prisoners’ dilemma games without punishment option first and decide afterwards whether to 
have a punishment option in the second phase or not, then 46% of subjects opt against using the 
punishment option in the second phase (Dal Bó et al., 2010). In Botelho et al. (2007), after having 
experienced both punishment and non-punishment institutions subjects decide whether they want 
to have the punishment option in the final period or not. Over all sessions, 77.8% of subjects opt 
against the punishment option. Sutter et al. (2010) investigate the effects of institutional choice 
by letting subjects vote for a VCM, an institution with reward possibility, and an institution with 
punishment possibility. Under unanimous voting, the punishment institution is rarely chosen. 
When it is selected, however, it is the most successful institution in eliciting high contributions; 
and it is significantly more efficient than the VCM. 
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If the one-time choice is between different punishment institutions, most subjects choose the 
softer punishment institution: In Decker et al. (2003), subjects play a public good game under two 
different punishment institutions before having the vote which of these two institutions should 
govern their interaction in the last phase of the experiment. The vote is always between a peer 
punishment institution and a “softer” punishment institution that set some limits to peer 
punishment. In three different votes, at least half of the subjects vote for the softer punishment 
institution (68.8%, 65.6%, 50.0%). 
Different than the papers discussed above, in the following studies, subjects may choose between 
a non-punishment institution and a punishment institution more than one time. In Ertan et al. 
(2009), in a public goods setting, subjects have the choice between different punishment 
institutions and a VCM without any punishment. Voting is repeated after a couple of periods (in 
one treatment there are 3 votes, in the other 5). In the very first vote, 57% of groups opt for the 
VCM. In the last vote, only 12.5% of the groups opt for the VCM while all remaining groups 
prefer applying the punishment institution. In this study, the most successful institution is one of 
the punishment institutions – in terms of contributions and efficiency. 
In the first period of the Gürerk et al. (2010) study, given the choice between a punishment and a 
non-punishment institution, 68.8% are reluctant to join the punishment institution while in the 
last period only less than 10% of the subjects do not prefer it. The simple voting with feet 
mechanism has great impact on contributions. Towards the end of the experiment, contributions 
in the punishment institution converge to almost 100% while the contributions in the non-
punishment institution are virtually zero. In the second half of the experiment, the eﬃciency of 
the punishment institution is significantly higher than the eﬃciency of the non-punishment 
institution. 
In another study Gürerk et al. (2009) model a teamwork situation. The manager decides whether 
her team should interact in an environment with punishment or reward possibilities. In the first 
phase of the experiment, 95% of the managers opt for the rewarding scheme. In the third and last 
phase of the experiment, however, 45% of the managers choose the punishment institution. In the 
endogenous treatment of the study by Tyran and Feld (2006), subjects vote whether to play a 3-
person public good game under a punishment institution or not. In the first vote, 50% of subjects 
vote against the punishment institution. In the second vote, however, only 30% are against the 
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punishment institution. The efficiency in treatment “mild punishment” is higher if this institution 
is endogenously chosen than exogenously installed.  
To sum up: From the studies discussed in this section the following pattern emerges. Initially, 
there is a great reluctance to choose efficient punishment institutions. With repetition, however, 
the acceptance of the punishment institutions increases. 
3. Experimental Design  
The experiment is based on a social dilemma game of 30 repetitions including three stages in 
each period: In Stage 0, N  participants in each “society” (representing an independent 
observation) choose (without a cost) between a non-punishment community (NPC) and a 
community with punishment possibilities (PuC). In Stage 1, each player is endowed with 20 
experimental tokens and can anonymously invest g ( 200  g ) in the joint project.5 The 
defining characteristic of a social dilemma is fulfilled independent of the number of members n  
with }2,1{  in each community because the marginal per capita return a  is 1/1  ani  for all 

in  with Nni  2 .6 In PuC, Stage 1 is followed by a punishment stage (Stage 2). Here, all 
subjects are endowed with 20 additional tokens and may anonymously assign punishment tokens 
to each other (subjects in NPC also receive additional 20 tokens and simply keep these). Each 
received punishment token lowers the payoff of the punished subject by three tokens. After each 
period, all participants receive feedback about contributions, received punishment tokens and 
payoffs in both communities. 
In SHT, the social history is handed out to subjects before the experiment starts. Participants were 
told that they would receive a report sheet about the decisions done by the participants of a 
previous experiment which was conducted in the […] before and that they should read the report. 
                                                           
5 If only a single player joins a community, no joint project can be created and the total endowment of the player is 
automatically transferred to own private account. Therefore this player has no decision in Stage 1 and Stage 2. 
6 While marginal gains from a unilateral defection (if other players contribute fully) is increasing with the group size, 
however, the marginal expected punishment is increasing too. Suppose, in case of a unilateral defection, each full 
contributor punishes the defector very smoothly only with 1 punishment token. This implies that – in case of 
unilaterally defection – the expected payoff reduction from received punishment in large groups outweighs the 
increase in income by far. The experimental data from the original treatment PUN (Gürerk et al. 2010) and also 
from many other studies involving peer punishment provide evidence for such harsh punishment of defectors. 
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For both communities, the social history separately tabulates the averages of the number of 
community members, contributions, received punishment tokens in PuC, and the payoffs of PUN 
for each period. Additionally, the over-time evolutions of the averages are visualized in figures. 
In SH-Half, subjects were given only the history of institutional choice as occurred in PUN.7 The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were 
recruited for voluntary participation via the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) 
and were randomly allocated to treatments. In total, 264 subjects participated in 22 independent 
observations.8 An experimental session lasted on average two hours. Average earnings were 24 
Euros. 
4. Results 
4.1. Initial periods 
Does social history have an immediate effect on subject's behavior? 
Result 1. Social history increases the initial acceptance of the punishment institution and 
increases the initial cooperation in PuC.  
In SHT, in the first period, 54.2% of subjects prefer PuC. This percentage is significantly higher 
(p = 0.037) than the fraction of subjects who opt for PuC in PUN (31.2%) and in SH-Half 
(33.3%, p = 0.024). 9 The acceptance remains robust if we consider the first five periods. On 
average, 59.2% of subjects opt for PuC in SHT whereas only 35.8% and 28.8% choose PuC in 
PUN and SH-Half respectively (SHT vs. PUN: p = 0.026; SHT vs. SH-Half: p = 0.001). 
Social history has an immediate eﬀect on contributions in the initial periods. In period 1, the 
fraction of high contributions (g ≥ 15) is significantly larger in PuC of SHT (74.0%) than in PuC 
of PUN (53.7%, p = 0.051) and in PuC of SH-Half (17.2%, p = 0.001). The overall initial 
                                                           
7 See Appendix for the two versions of the social history that were handed out to subjects in SHT and in SH‐Half. 
8 96 subjects (in 8 independent observations) participated in the original study PUN (conducted in December 2003), 
72 (6 observations) in the social history treatment SHT (conducted in November 2004), another 96 (8 observations) 
in SH‐Half (conducted in November 2011). Most participants were students recruited from economics, law, and 
social sciences departments. 
9 All reported non‐parametric statistical tests are two‐tailed Mann‐Whitney U‐tests and base on independent 
observations. 
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cooperation level in the first five periods is also highest with social history. In PuC of SHT, on 
average, subjects contribute 88.5% of their endowment while in PuC of PUN 70.1% of the 
endowment is invested (p = 0.013) and in PuC of SH-Half 40.1% (p = 0.001).  
Social history also immediately affects punishment behavior. In the first five periods, subjects in 
PuC of SHT invest considerably less tokens (3.6) in punishment than subjects in PuC of PUN 
(4.8 tokens) and in PuC of SH-Half (4.4 tokens) though the differences between treatments are 
statistically not significant. These differences could be driven by the initial high contributions in 
SHT making the use of punishment less necessary than in PUN and SH-Half. Higher 
contributions and lower punishment expenses in the initial periods result in higher average 
payoﬀs in PuC of SHT. In the first five periods, subjects in PuC of SHT earn on average clearly 
more (36.9 tokens) than subjects in PuC of PUN (29.9, p = 0.181) and in PuC of SH-Half (27.8, p 
= 0.059). 
4.2. Evolution of community choices and contributions 
Does the higher initial acceptance of the punishment community and the higher initial 
cooperation in PuC of SHT lead to a more accelerated acceptance of PuC by the subjects who 
initially opted for the non-punishment community than in the other treatments? 
Result 2. “Full participation in PuC” is reached more rapidly and is more stable in SHT than in 
PUN and in SH-Half.  
Panel a)-c) of Figure 1 shows the evolution of institution choices. In PUN as well as in SHT, for 
all but one society (observation) it is true that there is at least one period in which all subjects of 
the respective society join the punishment institution (in SH-Half 5 out of 8 societies). Such a 
period of “full participation in PuC” is observed much earlier in PuC of SHT (on average in 
period 9.6) than in PuC of PUN (period 17.6, p = 0.033) and also earlier than in PuC of SH-Half 
(period 19.6, p = 0.016). Moreover, the state of full participation is highly stable in PuC of SHT. 
The longest period of continuous full participation in PuC amounts on average to 15.4 rounds in 
SHT but only to 5.6 in PUN (p = 0.027) and 2.6 periods in SH-Half (p = 0.024). Thus, in PuC of 
SHT, full cooperation is established not only more quickly but it also lasts longer.10 
                                                           
10 Data from each single observation in PUN and SHT basically reflect the pattern of the averages as shown in Figure 
1 panels a) and b). This means, in each single observation, percentages of subjects choosing PuC increase over time 
10 
 
 
Figure 1: The bars in panel a)‐c) show the percentage of subjects choosing the punishment institution in each 
treatment. Average contributions from both institutions are also depicted in panels a)‐c). Panels d)‐f) display 
average payoffs in both institutions.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and also contributions in PuC show a steadily increasing trend. In SH‐Half, however, two out of eight observations 
do not follow these patterns. In these two observations, there is no increasing trend in percentages of subjects 
choosing PuC and also no steadily increasing trend of contributions.  
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4.3. Overall punishment behavior 
Does social history aﬀect the amount invested in punishment and the severity of punishment 
acts? Whether social history would lead to less or more punishment than observed in the baseline 
treatment is not clear. Social history could lead to less punishment because of the initial high 
cooperation level and the higher number of cooperative subjects. It could also lead to even more 
punishment if social history encourages subjects who would not punish otherwise to imitate their 
predecessors’ behavior from the baseline treatment and punish. 
Result 3. On average, punishment expenses are lower in SHT than in PUN and SH-Half.  
Overall, punishment expenses per subject (per period) are lower in PuC of SHT (1.0 tokens) than 
in PuC of PUN (1.5 tokens, p = 0.192) and in PuC of SH-Half (1.8 tokens, p = 0.142). This 
difference could be due to the higher contribution level in PuC of SHT. The higher the 
contribution level the less punishment is needed. Indeed, on average, a punished subject in PuC 
of SHT contributed more to the joint project than a punished subject in PuC of PUN did (17.4 vs. 
15.1 tokens, p = 0.022) and also more than in PuC of SH-Half (10.7 tokens, p = 0.001). 
In PuC of SHT, subjects engage more often in punishment of others who contributed less than 
themselves. In PuC of SHT, less-contributors receive punishment tokens in 53.9% of all possible 
cases (in PuC of PUN: 52.8%, in PuC of SHT: 33.8%). On the other hand, the frequency of anti-
social punishment, i.e., punishment against others who contributed equally or more is roughly the 
same in PuC of SHT (1.8%) and in PuC of PUN (2.2%). The average severity of anti-social 
punishment, however, is lower in PuC of SHT (1.5 tokens per instance) than in PuC of PUN (1.9 
tokens, p = 0.075) and in PuC of SH-Half (1.8 tokens, p = 0.345). 
4.4. Efficiency 
Does social history decrease the eﬃciency losses? How does the eﬃciency develop over the 
course of the experiment?  
Result 4. The payoffs in PuC catch up with the payoffs in NPC more quickly in SHT than in PUN 
and in SH-Half. Overall eﬃciency (over both institutions) is higher in SHT than in PUN and in 
SH-Half.  
12 
 
As can be seen in Figure panels d)-f), in the first period, subjects in NPC obtain higher payoﬀs 
than subjects in PuC in all three treatments. In SHT, however, average payoffs in PuC catch up 
with the payoﬀs in NPC more rapidly than in PUN and in SH-Half. In SHT, already in fifth 
period, members of the punishment institution obtain higher payoffs than members of NPC (cf. 
Figure 1 panel e). From period five on, the payoﬀs in PuC are constantly higher than the payoﬀs 
in NPC. In contrast, in PUN, the payoﬀs in PuC oscillate strongly and catch up with the payoﬀs 
in NPC only in period 11 (cf. Figure 1 panel d). The average period in which the earnings in PuC 
exceed the earnings in NPC is 7.2 in SHT, while it is 15.1 in PUN and 16.8 in SH-Half. Hence, 
PuC becomes the more profitable community significantly earlier in SHT than in PUN (p = 
0.037) and in SH-Half (p = 0.006).  
 
 
Figure 2: Overall payoffs 
 
From the social planner’s perspective, one of the most interesting issues concerns the eﬃciency 
in the society including all its communities. Figure 2 shows the overall society earnings in each 
treatment in three phases of the experiment. In all phases, the payoﬀs in SHT are higher than in 
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PUN and SH-Half. In SHT, the average payoﬀ of a society (over all three phases) amounts to 
47.1 tokens while it is 44.5 in PUN (41.9 in SH-Half). The surplus ratio, i.e., the actual surplus 
generated by cooperative behavior in the experiment divided by the maximum possible surplus 
amounts to 59.2% in SHT. This efficiency level is higher than the level PUN (37.5%, p = 0.101) 
and SH-Half (15.3%, p = 0.005).11 
5. Conclusion  
In this study, we explore whether informed subjects are less reluctant than uninformed subjects to 
join an institution with a peer punishment mechanism in a social dilemma situation and whether 
the society consisting of informed subjects obtain a greater eﬃciency. We observe a clear eﬀect 
of social history on the institution choice. With social history, initially, significantly more 
subjects join the punishment community than in the baseline treatment. Moreover, with social 
history, subjects joining the punishment community start to cooperate on a much higher level 
than the subjects who join the punishment community in the baseline treatment. With social 
history, the punishment expenses are also lower. In the beginning, in both treatments, the payoff 
differential between the punishment and the non-punishment community is negative for the 
punishment institution. However, with social history, the payoffs in PuC catch up with the 
payoffs in NPC more quickly than they do in PUN. As a consequence, the punishment institution 
of SHT attracts subjects more quickly than the PuC of the baseline treatment. The socially 
eﬃcient “ideal” state of “full participation” with (almost) full contributions is reached 
significantly earlier in PuC of SHT than in PuC of PUN. With social history, overall eﬃciency 
gains for the society as a whole are higher than without it.  
                                                           
11 As a referee pointed out, in SH‐Half, full cooperation is observed less frequently, and compared to PUN, the 
payoffs in SH‐Half are relatively low than one possibly may expect. Indeed, the difference between the efficiency 
levels in PUN and SH‐Half are quite high (37.5% vs. 15.3%, p = 0.130). These differences are mainly due to the 
greater variance in contribution behavior we observed in PuC of SH‐Half (as also mentioned in footnote 10). Why, 
there is such a variation? First, unlike in PUN, subjects in SH‐Half have to deal with some ex‐ante information on the 
institution choice. Possibly, the low acceptance rates of PuC in PUN in the beginning that are shown to subjects in 
SH‐Half influenced their beliefs and cooperation behavior such that these subjects contributed less than they would 
if they had no information on institution choice at all (as in PUN). A second possibility (as pointed out by the same 
referee) is that the effect observed here could possibly be due to the different timing of PUN and SH‐Half 
treatments (the sessions for SH‐Half were conducted 8 years after PUN). For all treatments, we recruited subjects 
in the same campus from the same fields of study and no subject (in any treatment) did participate in a similar 
experiment before. Hence, it seems unlikely that the relatively low payoffs we observe in SH‐Half are 
predominantly caused by a subject pool (cohort) effect. 
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Hence, with respect to our research question, the data clearly show that ex-ante knowledge about 
the punishment institution does not shun away the subjects from joining it. This information, 
provided to the subjects with the social history, does rather increase the initial acceptance of the 
punishment institution significantly. Moreover, social history works as a catalyst in reaching full 
contributions more quickly and in obtaining a higher overall efficiency.  
To identify whether the driving force behind the success of social history is social learning or 
imitation we conducted the SH-Half treatment in which subjects were provided with less 
information from the baseline treatment than in SHT. For all important variables, the data we 
observe in SH-Half is closer to PUN than to SHT. This regularity in behavior supports the 
conjecture that what is going on in SHT is indeed social learning and not mere imitation. This 
finding is a novel contribution of our paper to the literature compared to previous experimental 
studies on social learning.  
Although our findings unambiguously show that social history has clearly increased the initial 
acceptance and the overall efficiency of the punishment institution still there is potential for 
“improvement”. Roughly half of the subjects (45.8%) do not join the punishment community 
initially. Why is this? A possible reason could be the fear of anti-social punishment. Future 
research could clear this question by conducting an experiment that could restrict unjustified 
punishment in the punishment institution. Probably, more subjects choose then the punishment 
institution initially. Moreover, since unjustified punishment would be ruled out, the efficiency of 
the punishment institution may also increase. 
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Appendix  
Instructions for the experiment  
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to one of 2 subpopulations 
each consisting of 12 participants. During the whole experiment you will interact only with the 
members of your subpopulation. At the beginning of the experiment, 1000 experimental tokens 
will be assigned to the experimental account of each participant. Course of Action: The 
experiment consists of 30 rounds. Each round consists of 2 stages. In Stage 1, the group choice 
and the decision regarding the contribution to the project take place. In Stage 2, participants may 
influence the earnings of the other group members.  
Stage 1  
(i) The Group Choice  
In Stage 1, each participant decides which group she wants to join. There are two diﬀerent groups 
that can be joined:  
 Influence on the earnings of other group members 
Group A:  No 
Group B:  Yes, by assigning negative points 
 
(ii) Contributing to the Project  
In stage 1 of each round, each group member is endowed with 20 tokens. You have to decide 
how many of the 20 tokens you are going to contribute to the project. The remaining tokens will 
be kept by you.  
Calculation of your payoﬀ in stage 1: Your payoﬀ in stage 1 consists of two components:  
- tokens you have kept = endowment -your contribution to the project  
- earnings from the project = 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / 
number of group members  
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Thus, your payoﬀ in Stage 1 amounts to: 20 -your contribution to the project + 1.6x sum of the 
contributions of all group members / number of group members  
The earnings from the project are calculated according to this formula for each group member. 
Please note: Each group member receives the same earnings from the project, i.e. each group 
member benefits from all contributions to the project.  
Stage 2:  Assignment of Tokens  
In stage 2 it will be displayed how much each group member contributed to the project. (Please 
note: Before each round a display order will randomly be determined. Thus, it is not possible to 
identify any group member by her position on the displayed list throughout diﬀerent rounds.) By 
the assignment of tokens you can reduce the payoﬀ of a group member or keep it unchanged.  
In each round each participant receives additional 20 tokens in stage 2. You have to decide how 
many from the 20 tokens you are going to assign to other group members. The remaining tokens 
are kept by yourself. You can check the costs of your token assignment by pressing the button 
Calculation of Tokens.  
Each negative token that you assign to a group member reduces her payoﬀ by 3 tokens.  
If you assign 0 tokens to a group member her payoﬀ won’t change.  
Calculation of your payoﬀ in stage 2: Your payoﬀ in stage 2 consists of two components:  
- tokens you kept = 20 -sum of the tokens that you have assigned to the other group 
members  
- less the threefold number of negative tokens you have received from other group 
members  
Thus, your payoﬀ in Stage 2 amounts to: 20 -sum of the tokens you assigned to other group 
members -3x (the number of tokens you received from other group members)  
Calculation of your round payoﬀ : Your round payoﬀ is composed of Your payoﬀ from Stage 1 
20 -your contribution to the project + 1.6 x sum of the contributions of all group members / 
number of group members  
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+ Your payoﬀ from Stage 2 20 -sum of the tokens that you have assigned to other group members  
-3 x (the number of tokens you have received from other group members  
= Your round payoﬀ  
Special case: If you are the only member in your group you receive 20 tokens in Stage 1 and 20 
tokens in Stage 2, i.e., your round payoﬀ amounts to 40. You neither have to take any action on 
Stage 1 nor on Stage 2. 
Information at the end of the round: At the end of the round you receive a detailed overview of 
the results obtained in all groups. For every group member you are informed about her: 
Contribution to the project, payoﬀ from the Stage 1, assigned tokens (if possible), received tokens 
(if possible), payoﬀ from Stage 2, round payoﬀ.  
History: Starting from the 2nd round, in the beginning of a new round you receive an overview 
of the average results (as above) of all previous rounds. 
Report sheet about the decisions of participants of a previously conducted experiment: Each 
participant receives a report sheet about the decisions of participants of a previous experiment 
which was conducted in the […]. In this report you will find average numbers of the decisions of 
the participants. Please read this report before you decide. 
Total Payoﬀ: The total payoﬀ from the experiment is composed of the starting capital of 1000 
tokens plus the sum of round payoﬀs from all 30 rounds. At the end of the experiment your total 
payoﬀ will be converted into Euro with an exchange rate of 1 per 100 tokens.  
Please note: Communication is not allowed during the whole experiment. If you have a question 
please raise your hand out of the cabin. All decisions are made anonymously, i.e., no other 
participant is informed about the identity of someone who made a certain decision. The payment 
is anonymous too, i.e., no participant learns what the payoﬀ of another participant is.  
We wish you success!  
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Report sheet for the experiment (Treatment SHT) 
 
Figure 3: The social history provided in SHT treatment 
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Report sheet for the experiment (Treatment SH-Half)  
 
Figure 4: The social history provided in the SH‐Half treatment 
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